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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates movements of market indicators of banking fragility, namely, Japan
premium, stock prices, and credit derivative spreads of Japanese banks. Although the Japan premium
in the euro-dollar market seemed to have virtually disappeared since April 1999, credit and default
risks of Japanese banks has not necessarily disappeared. Other indicators show varying degrees of
fragility among Japanese banks in 1998-2001. Banking stock prices continue to slide compared to
the market-wide stock price index. From pricing of credit derivatives, default probabilitie of banks
can be etracted. Correlations among indicators were high both in the first period and in the second
period; Credit default swap (CDS) premium explains Japan premium with a significant, positive
coefficient. The higher the CDS is, lower go the stock prices. Before the capital injection of 1999,
the markets were more sensitive to bank vulnerability and higher premiums were required.
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１． １． １． １．Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction       
The Japanese banking system has been in turmoil since the mid-1990s.  Several mid-size 
banks failed in 1995, and three major banks failed in 1997-1998.  These failures prompted a 
major overhaul in bank supervision:  The government blanket guarantee was given to all 
types of deposits, capital injections to large banks were carried out, and a financial supervisory 
agency was established and reorganized, in 1998-1999.    After some tranquility from April 1999 
to late 2001, the bank vulnerability became apparent in 2002. This paper will investigate how 
different market indicators, Japan premium, stock prices, and credit derivative spread, have 
been warning vulnerability of Japanese banks from 1998 to 2002.  An analysis of credit 
derivative spread will be shown to be a most reliable indicator of credit risk of banks.     
Japanese banks have been plagued by several problems since the early 1990s.1  F i r s t ,  
the sharp declines of asset prices made many borrowers in the real estate and construction 
sectors insolvent.  In the beginning stage of the problem, banks continued to lend to these 
companies so that they can make interest payments.  Even after problems became so large, 
banks were quite reluctant to force nonperforming customers to fail.  Second, the prolonged 
recession, with the growth rate being one percent, produced many more nonperforming 
borrowers in many sectors of the economy.  Third, overextended businesses of banks 
                                                             
1 Previous studies of the bad loan problems, the financial fragility and crisis in the Japanese 
financial system in 1990s are vast. See for example Horiuchi (1999a) Cargill (2000), Ueda (2000) and 
Posen (2001). 
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themselves became costly.  Many banks had to retreat from overseas operations.  Fourth, 
Japanese banks traditionally hold equities of their customers and group companies.    When the 
Nikkei 225 index peaked in 1989 just shy of 40,000 yen, the banks were sitting on large 
unrealized capital gains, that helped to boost the capital adequacy ratio standard.  During the 
first half of the 1990s, the stock prices were hovering at around 20,000 yen, and unrealized 
capital gains shrank, but still positive.  However, when the stock prices further went down 
below 10,000 in 2001, equity portfolio started to carry unrealized capital losses, lowering the 
capital adequacy ratio. 
As the bank balance sheets have become damaged, the market started to discriminate 
against Japanese banks as a whole. Japan premium is a well-known phenomenon.  The 
premium is the extra basis points that Japanese banks had to pay in the offshore interbank 
market to borrow the US dollar market, and to lesser extent in the yen market.    The premium 
has varied across Japanese banks, and they have also fluctuated over time.  Whenever the 
Japanese banks were judged to be vulnerable, the market charged the Japanese banks an extra 
premium. Japan premium became a topic of conversation in 1997, after Hokkaido Takushoku 
Bank failed.  Since the government had said that it would not allow any of the major twenty 
banks to fail, the Hokkaido Takushoku Banks's failure was greeted by a surprise.    The market 
realized that some other Japanese bank could fail without much warning.  Peek and 
Rosengren (2001), Ito and Harada (2000), Horiuchi (1999) and Hanajiri (1999) regard the 
Japan premium as market indicator of investors’ anxiety about the soundness of Japanese   4 
banks to show how the markets responded.   
Then, two banks became in trouble in 1998. The Long-term Credit Bank (LTCB) 
became rumored to be very weak in the market, due to large nonperforming loans.  The new 
law had to be drafted and passed before the bank was nationalized on (DATE), 1998.  Then, 
the Nippon Credit Bank (NCB) was declared in December 1998 by the regulatory authority to 
be nationalized.   
In order to help calm the situation, and strengthen the capital base of banks, the 
government decided to inject public funds into banks.  In March 1999, 7459 billion yen was 
injected as preferred shares and subordinated debts to strengthen capital base of banks.  The 
Japan premium all but disappeared and many thought that Japanese banks were on the track 
to recover.  Increasing stock prices in 1999-2000, later known as an IT bubble helped the 
banks' balance sheets.  But, in 2001-2002, the bank fragility has become the issue again.  
First, When one department store, Mycal, applied for rehabilitation, the bank had to increase 
its provisioning, because the company was classified only as doubtful.    This raised a concern on 
the banks' lax standard for classifying loans.  Second, deferred tax credit have been counted 
toward capital. Provisioning by banks have been made from taxable income, and tax credit will 
be given in the following five years if banks earn enough profits to be taxable.  Deferred tax 
credits now occupy one half of the capital that is counted toward capital adequacy ratio. (See for   5 
example Kashyap (2002) 2).  Third, stock prices have been declining, and affecting banks' 
balance sheet where many equities are held.3  
The increase in Japan premium is limited.  One theory is that Japanese banks are 
now required to post cash collateral for interbank borrowings.    Collaterals can be offset against 
any losses that may be incurred if a bank defaulted on loan for any reason.  Another theory is 
that counterparties to Japanese bank interbank borrowings are now confident that even when 
a Japanese bank is declared to be failed, the regulators will quickly take over and honor any 
liabilities to avoid a cascade of defaults.   
In general stock prices reflect also the possibilities of default, as well as discounted 
future cash flows.  Since stock prices also reflect general conditions of the macro economy, an 
appropriate measure of bank vulnerability would be the difference between the change in the 
bank stock price and the change in the market-wide stock price index.  Our approach of using 
stock prices is different from those that used stock prices as one of the indicators to show the 
possibilities of default. Sato et al. (1990) was the first that utilized option model to examine 
default risk of Japanese banks.4  
                                                             
2 Kashyap (2002) provides a description of the issue, bank capital permitting to include tax. 
 
3 When middle-size brokerage Sanyo Securities went bankrupt in the beginning of November 1997, 
it was the first firm ever to default on the interbank market and brought a crisis. Since then, 
gavernment protected all interbank liabilities to avoild such a crisis.     
 
4 The intention of Sato et al. (1990) is not to evaluate default risk itself but the Japanese deposit 
insurance scheme and discussion of safety net as an insurance system. 
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Another measure of bank vulnerability has attracted attention recently. The credit 
derivatives are the instruments for possible default of credits.  The credit derivatives of 
Japanese banks have been traded, mainly by non-Japanese financial institutions, and their 
spreads over sovereign Japan is a meaningful measure for possible bank failure.  Even if 
interbank liabilities may be honored, either by collateral or regulator, credit derivative 
payments will be triggered.  Since default or failure is the triggering event, credit derivative 
spread seems to represent the credit risk most accurately among the three indicators.   
Credit risk is the probability that a borrower will default on a commitment to repay 
debt or bank loans.  It is influenced by bank-specific events and economy-wide events.  Any 
news that affect market and banks will influence perceptions on credit risk.  A broad measure 
of a bank's credit risk is its credit ratings (see appendix table1).  However, credit ratings are 
not observable in the daily basis.  A more frequent quantitative measure of credit risk is the 
credit risk premium.  The credit premium measured in this paper is the difference between 
the credit default swap of individual banks and that of Japanese sovereign credit. 
The contribution of this paper is as follows:  This paper examines the relationship 
among three indicators that are relevant to measuring health of the banks:  Japan premium, 
stock prices, and credit derivative spread.  To our best knowledge, this paper is the first to 
analyze systematically behavior of credit derivative spread for individual banks.   
Japan premium represents default risk in the interbank market.   It is closely related 
to risk of bank failure, but a failure may not necessarily result in non-payment of interbank   7 
obligation.  Either by having collateral or by regulator’s intervention, interbank obligations 
may be carried out even in the event of bank failure.  This possibility is more likely in 
2000-2001 than 1998-1999.  Therefore analysis of Japan premium after 2000 is structurally 
not comparable to that of 1998-1999, the highest period of Japan premium.  Stock prices are 
another indicator for bank soundness and profitability.  However, unless it becomes too low, 
ups and downs of stock prices reflect more of changes in profitability forecasts rather than 
changes in perception of default risk.  In terms of the reasons described the above, examining 
the relationship between the Japan premium and stock price movements that Ito and Harada 
(2000) are looking is not useful methodology in recent years.   
In contrast, credit derivatives directly measures credit risk. Credit derivative spread is 
a best measure of market assessment on how likely a bank is going to fail in a specified time 
horizon.    Therefore, this paper is unique in its exploiting a good data set in looking at changing 
vulnerability of Japanese banks from 1998-2002.5   
To anticipate conclusion, we will find in this paper the following results.   
(1) Correlation between indicators were much higher than expected not only in the first period, 
even in the second period;   
(2) Credit default swap (CDS) premium in the JP  (Japan premium) equation has a positive 
                                                             
5 Neal (1996) is the first in explaining the credit derivatives market’s development in the early 
1990s in the U.S. In it, it is explained how credit derivatives as new financial instruments for 
controlling credit risks is available.   
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and significant impact; 
(3) The sensitivity of JP (Japan premium) with respect to CDS became much smaller in the 
second period, confirming that there was some changes in the LIBOR market perception about 
the liability protection in the event of bank default;   
(4) CDS premium in the stock equation also has a negative and significant impact;   
(5) Before the capital injection of March 1999, in the first period, the markets were more 
skeptical and increased premiums. 
 
2.        Data Description 
2.1. Three indicators 2.1. Three indicators 2.1. Three indicators 2.1. Three indicators       
Default risks of Japanese banks appear in the three indicators: (1) Japan Premium (interbank 
borrowing); (2) Credit derivative (credit default swap); and (3) Bank stock price.  However, 
each indicator may show different (combinations) of risk.  Increased risk of default will raise 
(1) and (2) and decrease (3). 
  Credit derivative is the most direct way to measure credit risk, since it is pricing the 
default event.  Stock prices reflect the residual values of company assets as well as future 
discounted cash flows.  Even if the event of failure is remote, stock prices fluctuate due to 
changing prospects of profitability, reflecting both market - and economy-wide shocks as well as 
individual bank shocks.  LIBOR premium reflect the probability of interbank default.  
Interbank default may occur to a solvent bank, if, for some reasons, a bank cannot obtain   9 
(dollar or yen) liquidity.  On the other hand, interbank liability may be protected even in the 
event of bank failure.  Interbank credits may have higher priority in repayments than equity 
stake holders. 
  Japan premium became highlighted as an indicator of Japanese banks’ vulnerability 
in 1997-1998.  Western banks required higher interest rates when Japanese banks wanted to 
borrow in the offshore interbank market.  The premium was much higher in the US dollar 
interbank market.    This was thought to reflect the risk that Japanese banks would not be able 
to obtain enough dollars to repay the interbank loans, as their bank soundness was questioned 
as well as the outright possibility of bank failure.  In 1997 and 1998, Japanese banks had to 
pay nearly 100bps more than US and European banks to borrow dollar. 
  When vulnerability of Japanese banks reappeared in 2001-2002, there was no 
significant increase in LIBOR rate for Japanese banks.  The magnitude of Japanese premium 
in 2001-2002 was less than most 10 basis point.  However, the low Japan premium does not 
necessarily prove that the markets are less pessimistic about Japanese banks this time 
compared to in 1997-98.    First, weaker banks disappeared from data or exited form the market, 
either by withdrawing from the market or by being merged with other healthier banks.  
Second, even for the remaining banks, they are required to put up cash collaterals to obtain 
interbank funds.  Collaterals protect creditors from losses even in the event of counterparty 
(Japanese bank) failure.  Third, even in the three cases of the Japanese banks failure in 
1997-98, interbank obligations were repaid promptly.  The western banks may be optimistic   10 
about Japanese regulators’ competence and willingness to carry out interbank obligations 
promptly.  
 
2.2.  Japan  Premium  2.2.  Japan  Premium  2.2.  Japan  Premium  2.2.  Japan  Premium        
The Japan premium is a premium imposed on Japanese banks' borrowing rate by U.S. and 
European banks in the Eurodollar and euroyen market.  It reflected counter-party risk based 
on the western banks' belief that Japanese banks had higher risk of default.  In Ito and 
Harada (2000), the Japan premium is defined as the difference between the Eurodollar TIBOR 
(the Tokyo interbank offered rate, or the Eurodollar interbank borrowing rate in Tokyo) and the 
Eurodollar LIBOR (the London interbank offered rate, or the Eurodollar interbank borrowing 
rate in London) since it is viewed that the Japan premium emerged in the Eurodollar market 
the most. 
It reflects counter-party risk based on the western banks' belief that Japanese banks 
had higher risk of default, especially in the dollar market.  In particular, the dollar liquidity 
was a concern at the time of the 1997-98 crisis.    In this paper, Japan premium is defined as the 
difference between the interbank euroyen rate quoted by Japanese banks and the average of 
the rate quoted by the non-Japanese banks in the euroyen LIBOR samples.  The reason we 
used Euroyen rate rather than Eurodollar rate is availability of samples.  Sample banks are 
very limited if Eurodollar market is examined.     
Japanese banks use cash collaterals in interbank transactions since 1999 Spring.  It   11 
is said that default risk might not appear in the Japan premium since then.  We define the 
Japan premium as the following form; 
t it it M LIBOR M LIBOR JP 3 3 − =  
where  it JP  is the Japan premium of bank  i ,  it M LIBOR3  is the euroyen 3 month interbank 
rate quoted by bank  i and  t M LIBOR3   is the euroyen 3 month market rate at time  t .
6 
 
2.3. Credit Derivatives 2.3. Credit Derivatives 2.3. Credit Derivatives 2.3. Credit Derivatives  7  8 
Credit derivatives are over-the-counter financial contracts that have payoffs contingent on 
charges in the credit of a firm. It also reflects default risk. Credit default swap (CDS) are 
financial contracts that provides insurance against credit-related losses. 
Credit derivatives, the US dollar denominated default swap, are the average of offer 
and bid rates posted by brokers at the close of the Tokyo market.9  10  When both bid and offer 
                                                             
6 The euroyen LIBOR is calculated by the British Bankers’ Association as the average of the yen 
interbank offered rates.  Although the premium in the dollar market was serious rather than that 
in the euroyen market as described in Saito and Shiratsuka (2001), euroyen LIBOR is used in this 
paper since the sample Japanese banks in the euro dollar is very limited.   
 
7 We wish to acknowledge kind help by Mr. SAEKI Nobukazu of Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial and Ms. 
KAWAI Yuko of RP Tech for their answering our questions on the structure of the credit derivatives 
market. 
    
8 The market size is based on the officially surveyed statistics, the so-called Yoshikuni Statistics, of 
the Bank of International Settlements, presented in Appendix Table 4. 
  
9 Japanese credit derivatives market has started around the beginning of 1998. This was a relatively 
late start, however the market has been growing very fast.    Most products traded in the market are 
credit default swaps.  The default swap premium is the cost of a credit risk.  The investor who 
wants to avoid the risk is called “protection buyer “(risk seller) and pay a premium to be protected in 
case of credit event affecting the reference entity.  While the protection seller (risk buyer) receives 
the premium.  Protection seller (risk buyer) has to pay obligations to the seller if a credit event   12 
are missing for day t, then data of day t-1 is substituted in.  When one of a bid or an offer is 
missing, the value is substituted between observation days so that the bid and offer would not 
be reversed.  When missing days continue for a couple of days, we eliminated the period form 
our samples.  However, these days were not observed often since June 1998.  The original 
data are taken for all days when both offer and bid are shown by brokers.    Samples are for the 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (later Mitsubishi-Tokyo Holding), Fuji Bank, Daiichi Kangyo Bank, 
Industrial Bank of Japan (later those three becoming Mizuho Holding), Sanwa Bank (later UFJ 
Holding), Sumitomo Bank (later Sumitomo-Mitsui Bank), and Sovereign Japan.  11 
Credit derivative spread extracting Japanese bank’s provabilities of default risk is; 
t it it sovereign JAPAN BANK CDS   − =  
where  it CDS is the credit derivative spread of bank  i ,  it BANK  is credit default premium of 
bank  i and  t sovereign JAPAN  is sovereign premium at time  t .  
   
2.4. Bank Stock Prices 2.4. Bank Stock Prices 2.4. Bank Stock Prices 2.4. Bank Stock Prices       
Bank stock price movements relative to market index, the difference between the two, are 
                                                                                                                                                                                
occurs. 
 
10 There are several specificities in the credit derivatives market in Japan. One is the definition of 
credit events. ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions in 1999 clarify credit events, however 
“nationalization” of a Japanese bank is not confirmed. 
 
11 Our sample period reflects the availability of the CDS data since the market has started in the 
beginning of 1998. 
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defined as to express bank's risk of default.    The difference would be that; 
  t it it TOPIX stock STOCK ) log( ) log( − =  
where  it STOCK is the log difference of bank  i ’s stock price and market index  t TOPIX  at 
time  t .  The movement of specific bank stock price relative to other sectors can be examined.  
We construct specific bank stock price excluding other sectors by subtracting TOPIX from 
individual bank stock. That is, excluding general movements in the stock market, TOPIX, we 
can construct bank stock price movements. 
 
3. Correlation among Three Indicators 3. Correlation among Three Indicators 3. Correlation among Three Indicators 3. Correlation among Three Indicators       
3.1. Bank Mergers and Sample Break 3.1. Bank Mergers and Sample Break 3.1. Bank Mergers and Sample Break 3.1. Bank Mergers and Sample Break       
Although we cover the period from June 1998 to September 2002, there was a major change in 
the scenery of Japanese banking.  After mergers of several banks and trust banks, the four 
major banking groups emerged.  Due to the mergers, some banks are not comparable before 
and after these mergers.  Therefore we break the sample into two, the First half: from June 
1998 to September 1999, and the second half: from April 2001 to September 2002.  The big 
four financial groups were formed in the aftermath of the 1997-98 banking crisis.   
In September 2000, the Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Fuji Bank and Industrial Bank of 
Japan established the bank holding company, "Mizuho Holdings, Inc."  There are three banks 
under the holding company in 2002, the Mizuho Corporate Bank, the Mizuho Bank and the 
Mizuho trust and banking.   14 
In April 2001, the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Mitsubishi Trust and Banking, Nippon 
Trust Bank and Tokyo Trust Bank established the bank holding company, "Mitsubishi Tokyo 
Financial Group,Inc." Three trust banks merged in October 2001.  The group is dominated by 
the commercial bank, and since it did no involve a merger of commercial banks, there is 
continuity in the commercial banking part.   
In April 2001, "UFJ (United Financial of Japan) Group" was established by the Sanwa 
Bank, Tokai Bank and Toyo Trust and Banking.    The two commercial banks, Sanwa and Tokai, 
merged into UFJ Bank and Toyo Trust and Banking changed its name to UFJ Trust Bank in 
January 2002.  Sanwa is a nation-wide commercial bank, with emphasis in Kansai region, 
plus some international businesses, while Tokai is a bank based in Nagoya region.   
In April 2001, "Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp. (SMBC)," was established by a 
merger between the Sakura Bank and Sumitomo Bank.  This was straight-forward merger of 
two competing banks with similar nation-wide branch networks.  The two banks were at the 
core or respective corporate groups, which have roots in pre-war zaibatsu.  In this sense, the 
merger of the two banks put pressure on mergers of non-financial corporations in the two 
corporate groups too.   
These mergers and reorganizations are summarized in Table 1.   
Insert Table1 about here 
 
3.2. Three Indicators for each bank 3.2. Three Indicators for each bank 3.2. Three Indicators for each bank 3.2. Three Indicators for each bank         15 
Three indicators for each bank are shown in Figure 1 (Panels 1-1 to 1-6) for the first period and 
Figure 2 (Panels 2-1 to 2-2) for the second period.    Stock represents level of bank stock price,   
LIBOR (In the figures, LIBOR is denoted by LIBOR 3.) is the Japan premium described in 2.2, 
the difference between individual bank’s euroyen 3 month interbank rate and market rate, and 
CDS is representing credit derivative spread, credit default premium of bank i   minus 
sovereign premium as in 2.3.  LIBOR in the figures is ten times larger than original level for 
convenience.  
Insert Figures 1-1 to 1-6 about here 
In the first period, three indicators of all six banks show a similar time-series pattern. 
(1) Japan premium (LIBOR) shows quite dramatic increase from June to November 1998, and 
then decreased gradually April 1999.    (2) Credit derivative spreads show a similar pattern, but 
peaking slightly earlier than LIBOR and decreased more gradually than LIBOR.  (3) Stock 
prices had a sharp decline from June to September/October 1998, and then started to recover.  
After April 1999, all indicators are more or less calm.  (4) Japan premium and CDS basically 
disappeared after April 1999, when the second capital injection was completed, except Fuji, IBJ, 
DKB seemed have return of high LIBOR in the summer and fall of 1999.  The correlations 
among the three indicators seem to be fairly high between June 1998 and April 1999. 
An examination of these three indicators reveals that the market had discriminated 
quality of these banks.    The indicators tend to agree on the health of banks.     
(1) In the first period, Fuji Bank was regarded by the market as the riskiest among the six.  It   16 
had highest LIBOR, highest CDS, and most stock price decline.  In the second period, Mizuho 
was the worst in terms of the stock price change, the peak level of LIBOR (tie with UFJ), and in 
the peak level of CDS.  (2) The market regarded the Tokyo Mitsubishi as strongest among the 
six in the first period and among the four in the second period.    In all of the three indicators in 
both periods (except in stock price decline in the first period), the Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank is the 
best.  (3) Timing of the peak in LIBOR and CDS, and also the trough in stock prices tend to 
coincide for all banks.   This indicates that a shock to the banking sector was common, but 
vulnerability or sensitivity to the shock was different among different banks. 
Insert Figures 2-1 to 2-4 about here 
In the second period, CDS has increased markedly in December 2001 for all four financial 
institutions, Mizuho (spread of up to 204.5), Mitsubishi Tokyo (120), UFJ (192), and Mitsui 
Sumitomo (145.5).  Stock prices had declined steadily from the spring of 2001 to February 
2002.  The degree of decline was the most for the Mizuho (72.8%) and UFJ (70.1%), and the 
least  for  Mitsubishi-Tokyo  (43.5%).     
Insert Table2 about here 
The soundness evaluated by the markets did not change even after most major banks 
consolidated and formed four financial groups.  The Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank has been the best 
and Fuji, current Mizuho, has been the riskiest, according to the market.12  
                                                             
12 The capital ratios of banks disclosed publicly were all above a critical mark of 8% and differences 
among banks were not significant.  However, market participants might not have trusted these   17 
 
3.3. Correlation Analysis 3.3. Correlation Analysis 3.3. Correlation Analysis 3.3. Correlation Analysis       
Table 3 presents statistical summary of the levels of stock prices, LIBOR, and CDS. The table 
reveals the following characteristics of these market indicator movements. Those banks that 
had high CDS values (max and average) in either first or second period tended to have higher 
LIBOR (average and max) levels and a sharpest drop in stock prices ((max – min)/average).  
The averages of LIBOR and CDS were smaller in the second period except CDS of DKB and 
IBJ.    The averages of CDS for DKB and IBJ were smaller before their merger, but those of two 
banks become larger in the second period.    The ranges for LIBOR and CDS were much smaller 
in the second period than those in the first period.  The standard deviations (“s,d.” in Table 3) 
of LIBOR became smaller in the second period, but standard deviations of CDS did not change 
over  time.   
The worst bank in terms of CDS average was Fuji Bank in the first period, and 
Mizuho Bank in the second period.    The Mizuho is a product of a three way merger of Fuji, IBJ 
and DKB.  The three banks were the weaker three of the six in the first period. A merger of 
three weaker banks turned out to be one large weak bank, at least in the eyes of the market.   
                                                                                                                                                                                
numbers. The number included differed tax credit and capital injected by the government in 
1998-1999.  The adjusted capital ratios were widely circulated by research publications of 
investment banks and securities firms as well as academic work.    Appendix 2 and appendix 3 of this 
paper show that Tier1 capital adjusted for the deferred tax assets (the equity equivalent in excess of 
differed tax assets) and preferred shares. Excluding deferred tax assets in Tier 1 capital reduces the 
banks’ regulatory capital ratios substantially, especially in 2002. 
   18 
  Insert Table 3 about here        
Next, correlation coefficients among the three indicators are examined.  The stock 
prices and credit derivative spread are expected to be negative.  This is confirmed in the time 
of bank turmoil.  However, during the period of IT bubble, from 1999 to spring of 2000, stock 
prices of banks rose more than the market average, because banks hold a wide-range of stocks 
including IT-related stocks.    The CDS, representing credit risk, behaved differently from stock 
price movements.    The market participants of the credit derivatives were not impressed by the 
stock price increases.   
Insert Table 4 about here 
The correlation of the LIBOR and CDS are shown in Table 5.  The correlation is 
expected to be positive, as both represent the vulnerability of bank financial health.  This 
prediction is confirmed in the data. 
The correlation coefficient in the first period is uniformly higher than those in the 
second and third periods, suggesting that LIBOR3 represented credit risk more in the first 
period.  As suggested earlier in the paper, LIBOR3 lost direct relationship to credit risk after 
April 1999, because either collaterals are used or counter-parties believe interbank liabilities 
would be honored even in the case of a bank failure.  13 
                                                             
13 This information is obtained from the hearings we had with market participants. “Collaterals ” do 
not mean those under CSA (Collateral Support Annex, which is official transaction based on the 
regulation of ISDA), but collaterals here are part of the swap arrangement where the Japanese yen 
is used in the swap transactions in order for Japanese banks to obtain the U.S. dollar for a certain 
period. The “Japanese premium” is hidden in the interest rates used in this swap arrangement.     19 
Insert Table 5  about here 
Banks that are rated to be weak tended to have higher correlation in the second half period, 
especially in the relations of stock prices and credit derivative spread (-0.807 for Mizuho, -0.903 
for UFJ, -0.821 for Sumitomo Mitsui and -0.283 for BTM.    Long-term credit ratings for Mizuho, 
UFJ and Sumitomo Mitsui were single “A” that of BTM was “A+” at the end of March 2001.).   
 
4. Panel  4. Panel  4. Panel  4. Panel Analysis Analysis Analysis Analysis 
The panel regression is conducted in the following form. Dependent variable is either one of the 
following:  
t it it M LIBOR M LIBOR JP 3 3 − =  
t it it TOPIX stock STOCK ) log( ) log( − =    
As an independent variables, we use the following variables; CDS, Call rate and a dummy 
variable, where they are defined as follows:  t it it eign JAPANsover BANK CDS − = , Call = Call 
rate, uncollateralized overnight.14  For the interest rate, we use daily observations of the 
overnight uncollateral call rate, data being taken from the Toyo Keizai Monthly Statistics.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
  
14 We have examined panel regressions with a dummy variable that takes 1 before the second 
capital injection, March 1999, and 0 after April 1999.  The regression results were almost the same 
as the results presented in this paper.  The dummy variable was included to control for a possible 
regime change in bank financial soundness however the regression results are not shown because of 
the following econometric reason.   
      As long as a dummy variable is used in the panel regression, fixed effect model has a bias.   For 
the level data we use in our regression, fixed effect model is preferable since it brings us the same 
effect as the panel regressions in differenced form.     
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Both CDS and Call are expected to correlate positively with the Japan Premium and negatively 
with the STOCK.    Call rate is proxy for monetary policy so that an increase in call rate implies 
the tighter monetary policy and liquidity in the market, and it may lead to a higher possibility 
of  bank  failures.    
Tables 6-1, 6-2 and 6-3 report results of a panel analysis.  The regression results of 
OLS, with the fixed effect estimators, are reported in Table 6-1.  Stock prices are affected 
negatively by CDS, and the coefficient is statistically significant.    The Japan premium tends to 
be higher when the CDS is higher, and the coefficient is also statistically significant for both of 
the periods.  In equations (1) and (2), that examine whether CDS, as the fundamental default 
indicator, influences stock prices and the Japan premium.  The impact of CDS on the Japan 
premium in the second period is about one eighth of that in the first period (0.101 for the first 
half and 0.013 for the second half).  This evidence is consistent with our conjecture that the 
Japan premium became very small in the second period, because collateral is used or because 
market participants believe that a failure does not imply default in the interbank market.    The 
impact of CDS on STOCK has increased (larger coefficient in magnitude) in the second period 
(-0.0003 for the first half and -0.001 for the second half).    In fact, the size effect of coefficients of 
CDS in the second period is about four times larger than that of the first period.  Stock prices, 
representing profitability, is more sensitive to the default risk in the second period.  Therefore, 
unlike the Japan Premium, the default factor in stock prices has increased in the second period 
compared to the first period.  The signs of call rate sometimes are not consistent with our   21 
priors.   
Insert Table 6-1 about here 
Table 6-2 and Table 6-3 present the results of the OLS, pooled and the random effect 
estimators respectively.  Most of the results of Table 6-1 carry over to Tables 6-2 and 6-3.  The 
sensitivity of stock prices to CDS is similar for the first sample period, and they are negative 
and significant, and smaller in the first period. That of the Japan premium to CDS is also the 
same.  It is positive and significant for the first and second period, and much smaller in the 
second  half.    
An important finding of the Japan premium becoming insensitive to CDS is robust 
against different methods of panel regression.  A conventional wisdom in the market, that is, 
the Japan premium lost a value as an indicator of default probability of Japanese banks, is 
basically confirmed.  However, it is important to stress that the Japan premium and stock 
prices do react to changes in CDS that is a direct measure of default probability of Japanese 
banks.  Although the magnitude of CDS as well as that of the Japan premium has been lower 
in 2001-2002, compared to in 1998, this does not necessarily mean that reputations of Japanese 
banks have been recovered.  The stock and the interbank markets do react to the changes in 
the pricing of default risk of Japanese banks, although with lower sensitivity.     
Insert Tables 6-2 and 6-3 about here 
 
5.  Concluding  Remarks 5.  Concluding  Remarks 5.  Concluding  Remarks 5.  Concluding  Remarks         22 
In this paper we have exploited a newly collected data of credit derivative spread.  Since it is 
suspected that the Japan Premium no longer represents default risk of Japanese banks, credit 
derivative spread, CDS, is a more direct, better measure.  Examining the correlation between 
CDS and stock prices and the correlation between CDS and the Japan premium, it is found 
that the relationship between the three indicators are consistent with theoretical prediction.   
Higher CDS tends to be associated with lower stock prices and higher Japan premium.  This 
relationship seems to hold both in time-series, with the magnitude of impact changing overtime, 
and in cross-section.  This result is robust with respect to different methods of panel 
regressions or the sample period.     
One of the salient results of this paper is that the sensitivity of the Japan premium to 
credit risk is much lower in 2001-2002, compared to in 1998.  This should be an alarm to any 
research economist who may want to use the Japan premium data for the period after 2000.   
The LIBOR market seems to believe that even in the event of a bank failure in Japan, the 
interbank liability will be paid off either by collaterals or by the regulator.     
   23 
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stock LIBOR3 CDSFirst half Second half
June 1998 – Sept 1999 April 2001 – Sept 2002






Financial Group (Fig. 2-
2) Listed April 2001
MTFG is the financial holding company that owns the Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi
Trust and Bank, Nippon Trust and Banking and the Tokyo Trust. Later the three trust banks
merged into one.
Sanwa (Fig. 1-5) UFJ Group (Fig 2-3)
Listed April 2001







SMBC is the merged bank of Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank.




The three banks reorganized among themselves to form Mizuho Bank (individual customers),
Mizuho Corporate (corporate customers); and Mizuho Asset Trust & Banking (Trust Bank).





DKB 1310 505 -61.45% 10/1/98 45.38 11/10/98 203 8/24/98 A
IBJ 1260 440 -65.08% 10/1/98 39.38 11/5/98 200.5 9/28/98 A-
Fuji Bank 1430 259 -81.89% 10/1/98 45.38 11/10/98 446.5 10/12/98 A
BTM 1930 811 -57.98% 10/1/98 27.97 6/30/98 160.5 9/29/98 A
Sanwa Bank 1330 632 -52.48% 10/2/98 35.25 11/5/98 183 10/5/98 A






Mizuho HD 736000 200000 -72.83% 2/6/02 5.25 3/12/02 204.5 12/19/01 A
Mitsubishi Tokyo FG 1220000 689000 -43.52% 2/6/02 3.25 3/28/02 120 2/6/02 A+
UFJ HD 766000 229000 -70.10% 4/5/01 5.25 12/19/01 192 12/19/01 A
SMBC 1114 407 -63.46% 2/6/02 4.25 3/12/02 145.5 2/5/02 A
Level Date Level Date
Level, Lowest
in the spring of
2002
% decline Lowest Date
Table 2-B:  Second sample:
Stock Prices
Level (April 2, 2001), Lowest Level and (Date)
LIBOR Peak CDS Peak
Date Level Date % decline Lowest Date Level
Table 2-A:   First sample:
Stock Prices
Level (March 31, 1997), Lowest Level and (Date)
LIBOR Peak CDS PeakTable3 Statistics Summary
First half Stock price LIBOR CDS
Average Range s.d. Min. Max. Average Range s.d. Min. Max. Average Range s.d. Min. Max.
DKB 847 925 184 505 1430 8.77 56.62 11.35 -11.25 45.37 52.65 189.50 43.59 13.50 203.00
IBJ 836 970 214 440 1410 7.47 55.62 10.86 -16.25 39.37 52.61 187.50 43.61 13.00 200.50
Fuji Bank 772 1171 271 259 1430 9.83 61.62 11.69 -16.25 45.37 106.02 431.00 102.37 15.50 446.50
Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi 1419 1099 224 811 1910 4.99 35.38 7.93 -7.42 27.96 38.07 150.50 33.70 10.00 160.50
Sanwa Bank 1116 1053 198 632 1685 6.67 56.50 9.24 -21.25 35.25 41.29 172.50 37.32 10.50 183.00
Sumitomo Bank 1387 986 174 894 1880 7.93 41.12 10.07 -2.37 38.75 40.96 170.00 36.72 10.50 180.50
Second half Stock price LIBOR CDS
Average Range s.d. Min. Max. Average Range s.d. Min. Max. Average Range s.d. Min. Max.
Mizuho HD 385167 603000 151467 200000 803000 1.03 5.25 0.97 -1.00 4.25 104.56 170.25 46.84 34.25 204.50
Mitsubishi Tokyo FG 928292 651000 135726 689000 1340000 0.56 5.71 0.72 -2.46 3.25 50.71 103.00 23.26 17.00 120.00
UFJ HD 453136 741000 187461 229000 970000 0.83 6.25 1.00 -1.00 5.25 91.73 167.25 45.47 24.75 192.00
SMBC 742 822 205 407 1229 0.83 6.25 1.11 -1.00 5.25 66.32 127.25 31.28 18.25 145.50days DKB(Mizuho IBJ(Mizuho) Fuji(Mizuho) BTM Sanwa (UFJ) SumitomoMits
June 1998-Sept 1999 315 -0.588 -0.686 -0.76 -0.88 -0.763 -0.793
Oct 1999 – Sept 2000 216 0.662 0.7 0.81 0.713 0.705 0.557
April 2001 – Sept 2002 352 -0.283 -0.903 -0.821
days DKB(Mizuho IBJ(Mizuho) Fuji(Mizuho) BTM Sanwa (UFJ) SumitomoMits
June 1998-Sept 1999 315 0.656 0.655 0.661 0.651 0.719 0.724
Oct 1999 – Sept 2000 216 0.501 0.362 0.394 0.432 0.431 0.704
April 2001 – Sept 2002 352 0.451 0.529 0.583
Table 4     Correlation of (log(stock)-log(TOPIX)) and CDS
-0.807
Table 5     Correlation of LIBOR 3M and CDS
0.556Table 6-1 Panel Analysis; Fixed effect  
First Half JP STOCK
Variable  (1) (2)
CDS 0.101 *** -0.0003 ***
(0.00269) (0.000032)
CALL 21.858 *** 0.043 ***
(1.02847) (0.012244)
R2 0.593498 0.678364
 F1 41.238 *** 72.446 ***
 F2 30.491 *** 1058.4 ***
Asterisks ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Second Half JP STOCK
Variable  (1) (2)
CDS 0.013 *** -0.001 ***
(0.00064) (0.000034)
CALL -4.839 ** -0.113
2.24037 (0.119043)
R2 0.304329 0.998799
 F1 4.9716 *** 198.76 ***
 F2 10.803 *** 38603 ***
Asterisks ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Table 6-2 Pooled OLS  
First Half JP STOCK
Variable  (1) (2)
Intercept -0.463 *** -0.103 ***
(0.1726) (0.00328)
CDS 0.089 *** -0.001 ***
(0.0024) (0.000046)
CALL 24.485 *** 0.211 ***
(1.0083) (0.0192)
R2 0.574 0.142
F statistics 38.945 *** 480.57 ***
Asterisks ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Second Half JP STOCK
Variable  (1) (2)
Intercept -0.248 2.398 ***
(0.0540) (0.0816)
CDS 0.011 *** 0.002 ***
(0.00055) (0.00083)
CALL -7.254 *** 5.842 *
(2.201) (3.3251)
R2 0.288 0.007
F statistics 6.9767 *** 23771 ***
Asterisks ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 Table 6-3 Panel Analysis; Random effect  
First Half JP STOCK
Variable  (1) (2)
Intercept -0.738   -0.122 ***
(0.6076) (0.0416)
CDS 0.100 *** -0.0003 ***
(0.00267) (0.000032)
CALL 21.989 *** 0.043 ***
(1.0264) (0.012243)
R2 0.572290 0.136677
Hausman test 3.9776 ** 3.3594 *
Asterisks ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Second Half JP STOCK
Variable  (1) (2)
Intercept -0.139 * 2.733 ***
(0.0841) (0.6231)
CDS 0.013 *** -0.001 ***
(0.00063) (0.000034)
CALL -5.221 ** -0.113
(2.23067) (0.11904)
R2 0.287611 0.00457
Hausman test 3.3645 * 0.21855
Asterisks ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Appendix Table1 Credit ratings change
















3/22/96 Long-term New Rating AA
Short-term New Rating F1+
Individual New Rating B/C
Support New Rating 1
6/27/96 Long-term Affirmed AA Affirmed AA Affirmed AA
Short-term Affirmed F1+ Affirmed F1+ Affirmed F1+
Individual Downgrade C Downgrade C Downgrade C
Support Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1
10/27/97 Long-term Downgrade AA- Downgrade AA- Downgrade AA- Downgrade AA-
Short-term Affirmed F1+ Affirmed F1+ Affirmed F1+ Affirmed F1+
Individual Affirmed C Affirmed B/C Affirmed C Affirmed C
Support Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1
11/13/97 Long-term Downgrade A+ Downgrade A+
Short-term Downgrade F1 Downgrade F1
Individual Downgrade C/D Downgrade C/D
Support Affirmed 1 Affirmd 1
12/2/97 Long-term Downgrade A+ Downgrade A+ Downgrade A+
Short-term Downgrade F1 Downgrade F1 Downgrade F1
Individual Affirmed C Affirmed C Affirmed C
Support Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1
5/20/98 Long-term Downgrade A Downgrade A Downgrade A Downgrade A+ Downgrade A Downgrade A
Short-term Downgrade F1 Affirmed F1 Affirmed F1 Downgrade F1 Affirmed F1 Affirmed F1
Individual Downgrade C/D Affirmed C/D Downgrade D Downgrade C Downgrade C/D Downgrade C/D
Support Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1 Affirmd 1 Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1
2/10/99 Long-term Affirmed A Downgrade A- Downgrade A Affirmed A
Short-term Affirmed F1 Affirmed F1 Affirmed F1 Affirmed F1
Individual Downgrade D Downgrade D Downgrade C/D Downgrade D
Support Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1




6/16/00 Long-term Affirmed A
Short-term Affirmed F1
Individual Affirmed D




9/27/00 Long-term Affirmed A Affirmed A Affirmed A evision Outloo A evision Outloo A
Short-term Affirmed F1 Affirmed F1 Affirmed F1 Affirmed F1 Affirmed F1
Individual Affirmed D Affirmed D Affirmed D Affirmed C/D Affirmed D
Support Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1














Individual ating Watch O D ating Watch O D ating Watch O D ating Watch O C/D ating Watch O D
Support
3/30/01 Long-term Affirmed A+ Affirmed A
Short-term Affirmed F1 Affirmed F1
Individual Affirmed C/D Affirmed D
Support Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1
8/6/01 Long-term Affirmed A Affirmed A Affirmed A Affirmed A+ Affirmed A
Short-term
Individual Downgrade D/E Downgrade D/E Downgrade D/E Downgrade D Downgrade D/E
Support
9/18/01 Long-term Affirmed A Affirmed A Affirmed A
Short-term Affirmed F1 Affirmed F1
Individual Affirmed D/E Affirmed D/E Affirmed D/E
Support Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1
11/26/01 Long-term Downgrade A- Downgrade A- Downgrade A- Downgrade A Downgrade A-
Short-term Downgrade F2 Downgrade F2 Downgrade F2 Affirmed F1 Downgrade F2
Individual Affirmed D/E Affirmed D/E Affirmed D/E Affirmed D Affirmed D/E
Support Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1 Affirmed 1
Ratings history data are obtained from the FITCH Ratings, that contains International long- and short term ratings, individual and support ratings.
The below is based on the definition given by FITCH. Long- and short-term ratings assess its general creditworthiness on a senior basis.
The difference between long- and short- is the maturity of obligations. A short-term rating has a horizon of less than 12 months.
Therefore short-term ratings place emphasis on the liquidity necessary.
The individual ratings assess how a bank would be viered if it were entirely independent and could not rely on ecternal support.
Individual ratings therefore are for management of risk, and the likelihood that it would run into significant difficulties.
Support ratings are not about the quality of a bank, but they are the assessment of whether the bank would receive support. Appendix2 Genuine Capital Ratio (at September 30,2001)
As percentage of weighted assets
Tier 1 capital Publicfunds Pref securities Other pref.cap Tax effect Genuine Tier 1
DKB 5.52% 2.09% 0.00% 0.00% 2.26% 1.17%
IBJ 5.95% 1.32% 1.13% 0.00% 1.84% 1.67%
Fuji Bank 4.73% 1.94% 0.48% 0.38% 2.39% -0.45%
Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi 5.18% 0.00% 0.00% 0.51% 1.80% 2.87%
Sanwa Bank 5.45% 1.80% 0.54% 0.45% 1.94% 0.73%
Sumitomo Bank 6.04% 1.93% 1.24% 0.00% 2.51% 0.37%
*“Genuine”Tier 1 capital excludes preferred instruments and tax effect.
Source: Fitch Ratings.Appendix3 Genuine Capital Ratio (at September 30,2002)
As percentage of weighted assets  
Tier 1 capital Excluding 90% of Tax Effect Less Public Fund GenuineTier1*
Mizuho HD 5.27% 3% 0.45% -0.99%
Mitsubishi Tokyo FG 5.24% 4% 3.57% 2.86%
UFJ HD 5.77% 3% 0.26% -1.83%
SMBC 5.37% 3% 0.45% -1.21%
*“Genuine”Tier 1 capital excludes preferred instruments and tax effect.
Source: Fitch Ratings.Appendix Table 4 Credit Derivative trading volume（principal amounts：million dollar）
June-99 December-99 June-00 December-00 June-01 December-01
OTC total volume 11,159 16,538 14,691 13,281 14,309 17,432
6-month growth (%) 48.2% -11.2% -9.6% 7.7% 21.8%
one-year growth (%) 31.6% -19.7% -2.6% 31.3%
Credit Default Swaps Total 10,230 12,831 12,248 11,698 12,815 15,127
Credit Default Swaps (Selling) 5,173 3,388 3,259 3,599 4,275 4,357
Credit Default Swaps (Buying) 5,057 9,443 8,989 8,099 8,540 10,770
6-month growth (%) 25.4% -4.5% -4.5% 9.5% 18.0%
one-year growth (%) 19.7% -8.8% 4.6% 29.3%
Total Return Swaps Total 338 2,707 1,630 956 888 1,269
Total Return Swaps (Selling) 65 1,289 459 19 175
Total Return Swaps (Buying) 273 1418 1171 956 869 1,094
Credit Spread Total 36 16
Credit Spread (Selling) 36 16
Credit Spread (Buying)
Credit Link Note Total 502 921 731 561 550 1,024
Credit Link Note (Issurance) 270 629 591 561 144
Credit Link Note (Purchase) 232 292 140 406 1,024
Others Total 55 55 82 67 55 12
Others（Selling） 55 55 55 55 6
Others（Buying） 27 12 55 6
Source; BIS Derivative Survey(http://www.boj.or.jp/en/siryo/siryo_f.htm)